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Developing performance audit in Spanish local government: an empirical 
study of a way forward 
Unlike many other countries in the developed world, performance audit in the 
Spanish public sector has not advanced very quickly, and the progress which has 
been made has happened in a disjointed manner. Moreover, the current financial 
situation in the Spanish public sector suggests that while performance audit could be 
a key tool for improving public sector performance, there is a paucity of research on 
this issue. 
This paper describes recent empirical research concerning the development of 
performance audit in Spanish local government. The authors discuss some of the 
key issues involved in the extension of performance audit in Spanish local 
government and make recommendations for its improvement. The main questions 
addressed are: 
•What is the current position regarding the development and application of 
performance audit in Spanish local government? 
•Is there sufficient auditing in Spanish local government concerning performance 
improvement and accountability? 
•What support is there for possible changes to Spanish audit regulations? 
•What is needed to develop and apply effective performance audit in Spanish local 
government? 
The nature of performance audit 
For the purposes of this research, the literature was considered under three themes: 
The relevance of performance audit in the public sector 
The term ‘new public management’   (NPM) describes public sector reforms carried 
out in late 20th century in many countries (O’Flynn, 2007). One aspect of NPM 
(Azuma, 2005) has been a focus on improved performance, and Holmes (1992) 
described a recurring theme of public sector reform involving both improving 
performance and enhancing accountability. Some authors argue that the 
implementation of performance measures has often been the critical link that impacts 
the success or failure of government programmes (Long and Franklin, 2004). 
Performance audit has emerged within this trend as a by-product of public sector 
reform which concentrated on output-focused public administration. Performance 
audit has been described as central to the ‘reinvention of government’ (Power, 1994, 
p. 16). 
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International developments in performance audit Performance audit has an 
international relevance. The commencement of performance audit has been traced 
as far back as the 1960s (Pollitt and Summa, 1999), but some authors maintain that 
performance audit as distinct practice dates mainly from the late 1970s. International 
reviews and comparisons of performance audit  have  been  a  matter of interest for 
many years, including the works of Glynn (1985) and Pollitt (2003). Most research 
studies were from Canada, the UK and Australia. The UK is a good example of the 
implementation of performance audit in local government; this is described in reports 
and studies published by the Audit Commission (2009a, 2009b), the LGA (2010), 
and individual researchers like Lapsley and Pong (2000) and Boyne et al. (2002), 
among others. 
Key aspects of performance audit 
There are several aspects of performance audit which need consideration. 
First, performance audit may be undertaken by different types of auditor; the two 
main classifications being internal auditors and external auditors. The Chartered 
Institute of Internal Auditors (CIIA) defines internal audit as: 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an organization’s operations. 
In this definition there is a clear reference to performance audit in relation to adding 
value and improving operations. In relation to external audit, the International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions’ Auditing Standards distinguishes 
basically two types of audit that a government auditor may perform— regularity audit 
and performance audit (INTOSAI, 1992). Thus performance audit is clearly the 
province of both types of auditors working separately or in collaboration. In 
determining the extent and scope of the performance audit, external auditors usually 
need to assess the reliability of audit activity undertaken by the internal auditors. 
Second, performance audits can also be undertaken using a variety of different 
approaches (or combinations of approaches) with different emphases, depending on 
the specific circumstances. An example of two different methods which may be 
employed are the performance directly approach, which focuses directly on the 
magnitude of performance achieved and concentrates on inputs, outputs, results and 
impacts; or the auditing control systems approach, which is designed to determine 
whether the audited entities have designed and implemented management and 
monitoring systems so as to optimize performance (Daujotait and Macerinskien, 
2008). However, INTOSAI suggest a threefold analysis of approaches involving a 
result-oriented approach (which assesses whether pre-defined objectives have been 
achieved as intended); a problem-oriented approach (which verifies and analyses 
the causes of a particular problem[s]); or a system-oriented approach (which 
examines the proper functioning of management systems). In practice, it is not 
unusual to find that performance audit involves a combination of several approaches. 
Third, there is the issue of the focus of the performance audit. If an auditing control 
systems approach is adopted, the initial focus of the audit will be the compliance of 
relevant systems to some external standard. This could be planned standards or 
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best practice standards from other organizations. However, such a focus is 
essentially using compliance with standards as a surrogate for actual performance 
as expressed through such matters as results, impacts etc. On the other hand, if the 
focus of the performance audit is a performance directly approach, then the auditors 
will focus directly on the levels of performance being delivered. This will usually imply 
a focus on the triple, but related, themes of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
This has been described by INTOSAI (1992, p. 19) as follows: 
An audit of the economy of administrative activities in accordance with sound 
administrative principles and practices, and management policies. 
An audit of the efficiency of utilization of human, financial and other resources, 
including examination of information systems, performance measures and 
monitoring arrangements, and procedures followed by audited entities for 
remedying identified deficiencies. 
An audit of the effectiveness of performance in relation to the achievement of 
the objectives of the audited entity, and audit of the actual impact of activities 
compared with the intended impact. 
The Spanish context 
Local government in Spain 
The Spanish system of government is divided into three levels—the federal state, 
autonomous regions, and local authorities. Below the federal level, Spain is divided 
into 17 autonomous regions, each with its own government and parliament which 
depend on central government for funding. Each region has its own powers and 
responsibilities which are broadly similar, but which show some differences from one 
region to another. Within each region, local authorities are of two types—provincial 
councils covering more rural areas, and town councils covering more urban areas. 
Spanish local government has used a model in which directly elected politicians 
decide on matters such as the organization of the provision of services, or 
establishment of taxes and fees at local level. They provide a series of basic 
services the range of which depends on their population size. 
The Spanish constitution lays down two basic principles with regard to local 
authorities: financial autonomy and financial self- sufficiency. The principle of 
financial autonomy means that local authorities can make their own decisions on 
resources and how to spend them. The principle of financial self-sufficiency is aimed 
at ensuring that all local authorities have the necessary resources to meet their 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, local authorities are still strongly dependent on 
regional and central funding. In fact, the existing funding model has been criticized 
for being unfair and for causing permanent financial tension. Thus there is a lack of 
linkage between the revenue that can be generated and the services that must be 
provided. This situation gets worse if we consider the requirements for deficit 
reduction and fiscal consolidation derived from the financial crisis. These financial 
constraints of local public finance have to be considered in conjunction with some 
internal management weaknesses, mainly rigidity and bureaucracy, absence of a 
solid performance control system, little accountability regarding performance, 
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negative perception, insufficient co-operation with other social agencies, territorial 
inequalities and deficit of coverage (Subirats, 2007; Fantova, 2008). 
Audit and financial control arrangements in Spanish local government 
This can be considered from both an internal and external perspective.  Internal 
financial control is operated by staff from the local authority itself and aims to protect 
its assets and to ensure, as far as possible, the correctness and accuracy of 
accounting records. It also includes the financial accounting and the custody of 
assets, as well as controls to improve operational efficiency and ensure compliance 
with organizational policies. As part of this financial control regime, local authorities 
will have an internal audit function. The internal auditor must assess financial 
aspects of local authorities’ services, including; the adequate presentation of 
financial information, compliance with the applying standards and guidelines, and the 
degree of efficiency and effectiveness in the achievement of the preset objectives. 
The audit is undertaken in accordance with public sector auditing standards, and its 
conclusions and observations will be gathered in a written report (article 220 of the 
2004 law regulating local tax offices—the ‘TRLRHL’). The internal auditor should 
also carry out an effectiveness inspection which ‘shall be designed to check 
periodically the degree of fulfillment of objectives, as well as the analysis of the cost 
of the activity and the service performance’ (article 221 of the TRLRHL). However, 
the extent to which this is achieved seems limited. 
External financial control and audit of local authorities are undertaken by an external 
body which may be the national court of audit and/ or, where appropriate, a regional 
audit institution. The national court of audit originated in the first half of the 19th 
century. However, since 1984 some autonomous regions have set up audit 
institutions, which depend on and are accountable to their respective regional 
parliaments, in order to make possible the external audit of the regional and local 
public sector organizations. The audit functions performed by the regional audit 
institutions must be compatible with the functions performed by the court of audit. 
Both national and regional audit organizations are commonly known as ‘OCEX’ 
(external control bodies). The national court of audit is considered by the Spanish 
constitution as the supreme audit institution for both the accounts and the financial 
management of the state and the public sector. The regional audit institutions are 
controlled by regional parliaments. The relationship between the regional audit 
institutions and the court of audit is through a co-ordinating committee, founded in 
May 1989. This committee establishes common audit criteria and techniques to 
produce accurate results and avoid duplication in auditing. Also, regional audit 
bodies refer a copy of their reports to the court of audit. The findings from the audits 
undertaken by OCEX are sent to the relevant parliament and to the audited body 
itself and are published in the relevant official bulletin. External audits of public sector 
agencies including local government, in Spain are mostly undertaken by statutory 
public auditors employed by OCEX. Legislation (such as the Organic Law 2/2012 of 
Budget Stability and Financial Sustainability) allows private external auditors to work 
with public bodies. However, this does not happen very often, although it is 
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increasing. New legislation is needed to increase private sector involvement in public 
audit. 
Public service reform in Spain 
Reforms of the control of public performance are taking place more slowly in Spain 
than in many other countries (García, 2007). In Spain, regulations adopted in the 
previous decade created a theoretical scenario for public management to be driven 
by the principles of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency but the impact has 
been limited and further legislative developments which prompt a real cultural 
change in the public sector are still to come. 
Great political controversy has emerged concerning two laws designed to strengthen 
public sector performance. A law on the streamlining and sustainability of local 
government aims to clarify local government powers to avoid overlaps, define 
powers between different organizations and to clarify how those services are 
provided and with what money. The law also streamlines the structure of local 
government and establishes an assessment and oversight system to promote quality 
in the provision of public services. In this regard, it aims to strengthen the role of the 
local auditors and to provide them with greater impartiality. The second piece of 
legislation— the law of transparency—includes requirements to publish financial 
statements, performance measures, and audit reports. 
These changes recognize the need to strengthen control of the public sector, with 
performance audit being a key instrument in this task. The current financial crisis can 
be seen as an opportunity for local government to improve its systems, structures 
and procedures. 
Development of performance audit in Spanish local government 
The spread of performance audit in Spanish local government has been slow. At the 
internal control level, it is generally agreed that there is a lack of clarity in Spanish 
legislation regarding the definition of the content and scope of audit and financial 
controls in local government (Pablos, 1997). Studies such as by Biosca (2010) have 
revealed serious weaknesses in internal control within Spanish local government. 
Unfortunately, there is no statutory set of procedures or a code of practice and the 
auditing standards for the public sector are inadequate. 
Equally, the focus put on performance audit by OCEX is a matter of conjecture in 
local government and, in practice, financial regularity and legality audit strongly 
dominate. This issue was considered by FIASEP and REA (2009), which, while 
highlighting the need for stronger financial audit, also noted that the use of 
performance audit still remains exceptional. Bastida and Guillamón (2009) 
discovered that some local authorities were undertaking performance audits on a 
voluntary basis. Another study (Erbiti, 2005) found that a high percentage of the 
population thought that auditors should put more emphasis on how public resources 
are managed in terms of performance and results. 
The autonomy of Spanish local government contrasts with systems in other more 
centralized countries, such as the UK, where performance measures play a clearly 
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defined role in national evaluation and control. According to Torres et al. (2011), the 
environmental context and the lack of a central government top-down approach in 
this field could explain that, at present, Spanish local government is experimenting 
with different approaches to implementing performance measurement systems. Also, 
research by García (2007) and Cárcaba (2002) has shown that there is an interest in 
complementing the traditional budgetary and accounting techniques with new 
reporting tools, such as performance indicators. The use of performance measures 
by Spanish local authorities is voluntary and the enhancement of performance audit 
(both external and internal), coupled with the improvement of the information 
systems, are some of the challenges still to be faced by Spain, particularly in local 
government. 
Moreover, the development of external performance audit in Spanish local 
government is believed to have been hindered by, on the one hand, the absence of 
inadequate internal performance control mechanisms and clear definitions of 
objectives and indicators (Fernández, 2010). A further limiting factor arises from 
important weaknesses of the performance reporting frameworks and the breach of 
duty of accountability (Mira-Perceval, 2006). Furthermore, there is a shortage of 
human and material resources in OCEX in relation to the conduct of performances 
audits and minimal statutory procedures and guidelines to follow. The lack of co-
ordination between internal and external auditors is also considered to be an area for 
improvement, together with the deficiencies in the disclosure policy and the clarity of 
the reports (Medina, 2010). 
Research methodology 
Prior to commencement of the primary research, a comprehensive search of 
academic and public policy literature was undertaken, together with an in-depth 
period of research in the UK. Subsequently, the authors undertook a national survey 
in Spain directed at the staff responsible for  internal  audit  in local government and 
members of the external control bodies (or OCEX). This survey   was intended to 
identify points of agreement and difference regarding the development ofexternal 
performance audit. Prior to its launch, a pre-test was applied and the online platform 
used was validated by a group of academic experts. 
With regard to internal auditors, the survey was directed to those working at Spanish 
municipalities with at least 20,000 inhabitants, which amounted to 387 in 2010, 
according to data from the Spanish national institute of statistics (INE). After data 
collection, responses from 109 internal auditors were obtained, covering 28.1% of 
the total population. Responses collected came from 30 different provinces, which 
belonged to 14 of the 17 autonomous communities in Spain. The sampling method 
used did not involve probabilistic sampling. 
 
As regards the statutory external auditors (OCEX), the population size was given by 
the number of OCEX units in Spain—14 at the end of 2011. The sampling method 
was non- probabilistic: 15 responses were obtained from six different OCEX units. 
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The response rate is shown in table 1. Two variables or attributes were identified. 
First, the ordinal variable ‘opinion’, which measures the level of acceptance of the 
respondents regarding the matters questioned. A Likert scale of 0 to 4 was adopted 
for this variable; ‘1’ meaning total agreement; ‘2’ agreement;  ‘3’ disagreement; ‘4’ 
total disagreement; and ‘0’ don’t know/no answer. Second, the nominal variable 
‘group’ to which the respondent belongs. This may adopt two possible values ‘1’ 
(internal auditors) or ‘2’ (external auditors).  
 
The responses were treated statistically using contingency tables, independence 
testing and association coefficients. 
Research findings 
Although performance audit is officially part of the duties and responsibilities of 
OCEX, it is financial, regularity and legality audit which has dominated audit practice 
in Spain. Performance audit is still seen as a challenge for OCEX and even more so 
in local government. The issues addressed are summarized in table 2. 
 
OCEX place sufficient emphasis on performance audit: There is a very strong 
consensus of views between both internal auditors and members of the OCEX in 
disagreeing with the above statement. This would imply that performance 
management ought to be given much more attention within external audit practice 
than is currently the case. When the attributes ‘group’ and ‘opinion’ were considered 
dichotomously, both Pearson’s and the chi-squared test were insignificant, which 
means that either factors or attributes are independent. In other words, the internal 
auditors and members of the OCEX did not differ on this issue. 
 
OCEX audit letters contribute to good accountability on performance: On this issue 
and the next one, the results show a strong lack of consensus between the internal 
auditors (who mostly disagree) and the external auditors (who mostly agree) as to 
the contribution of audit letters on accountability and performance. This is 
corroborated by both Pearson’s chi-squared test (p value: 0.00) and Yates’ 
correction for continuity (p value: 0.00) which are significant and indicate that internal 
auditors and members of the OCEX reveal differences in their opinion as to the 
usefulness of the performance audit reports. The reasons for this difference are 
important but not clear. It could be that the OCEX members are more benevolent 
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regarding the usefulness of their external audit reports and less critical about the 
effectiveness of their own work. Further qualitative work would be needed to unpack 
this matter. 
OCEX audit activities provide an incentive to performance improvement: Again, there 
was a stark contrast between the views of OCEX and the internal auditors. On the 
other hand, tests indicated that internal auditors and members of the OCEX had 
different opinions about the capacity of the external control to encourage the 
improvement of management. OCEX auditors assessed their own performance 
positively. 
OCEX should undertake performance audits in a regular and systematic way: There 
was a strong consensus between internal auditors and OCEX on the demand for a 
regular and systematic practice of performance audits by OCEX. 
OCEX regulations regarding the conduct of performance audits need tightening: 
There was quite strong agreement from both groups to this statement. 
OCEX should undertake performance audits based on local authorities’ self-
assessments: Overall this statement was accepted—agreement was over 60% for 
internal auditors, and over 90% for members of OCEX. 
A number of important themes emerged from our data. First, there was strong 
agreement between both internal and external auditors about the need to place 
greater emphasis on the application of performance audit in Spanish local 
government, which should provide a basis to accelerate development. There was 
also strong agreement among both types of auditors that performance audits should 
be undertaken in a more regular and systematic way and that regulations regarding 
the conduct of performance audit need tightening. Again, this degree of consensus 
should provide a basis for accelerating development. There was strong agreement 
that self-assessment by local authorities should provide the initial basis for the 
conduct of performance audit. However, there was strong disagreement between the 
two types of auditors about the effectiveness of current performance audit 
arrangements in relation to improving performance and accountability. This large 
difference in perception about current arrangements might be a barrier to the further 
development of performance audit. 
Proposals for further development of performance audit in Spanish local 
government 
Our research suggests a number of ideas that might contribute to the development 
of external performance audit in Spanish local government. First, external 
performance audit should be implemented in a regular and systematic way. Both the 
autonomous communities’ statutes and the laws affecting the court of audit need to 
be reformed so that there is political consensus about how value for money is 
controlled in local government. Common recommendations on the internal 
organization of the OCEX are also needed. When carrying out a performance audit, 
OCEX should use local government’s self-assessments as a starting point. 
Collaboration and co- ordination between internal and external audit is an effective 
mechanism for achieving a proper and comprehensive review of local management. 
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Table 2. Summary of results (%). 
 
Second, there is an increasing demand for clear, accessible information from 
citizens. Audit letters should therefore report on the assessment of performance 
achieved by local authorities in order to improve accountability on performance. It 
could be interesting to consider the example of the UK in this regard, where the Use 
of Resources Assessment included a value-for-money conclusion integrated in the 
audit letter. Publication on the internet made its content available to the public, which 
leads us to the issue of the minimal publicity given to OCEX actions in Spain. The 
OCEX could improve on their image by publishing their findings more widely. 
According to the rules governing audit, the auditor is required to review the internal 
control system. This review should be the basis for the decision on which audit 
approach to adopt. However, this requires the accounting system of the audited 
entity to be able to provide sufficient information about the performance being 
achieved. Evaluation of effectiveness is impossible if the audited body does not have 
clear and quantified objectives. Similarly, without a system of internal control that 
comprises a set of performance indicators and information on costs, value-for-money 
assessments can be limited to a mere descriptive and analytical examination without 
being able to establish rigorous comparisons or make reliable judgments. This being 
the case, some people have argued that the regional OCEX need to be required by 
their respective parliaments to report on the reliability of the performance indicators 
in the accounts produced by government agencies and public sector enterprises. 
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Conclusions 
Performance measurement is a valuable practice for management in local 
government. Performance audit may contribute to public management in that it offers 
an external perspective about the way that services are planned, executed and 
controlled within an organization. Simultaneously, performance audit provides a 
mechanism for sanctioning public sector intervention and for explaining the use of 
resources in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Some countries have already 
taken a lead role in the development of external performance audit in local 
government. However, in Spain, its use remains limited although both the legislation 
and literature acknowledge its importance and necessity. 
This paper has analysed the current development of performance audit in Spain and 
the factors that are hindering its expansion. Among the actions proposed for further 
development of external performance audits in Spain, we suggest it should be done 
in a regular and systematic way, with an agreed basic content. To improve 
accountability, audit letters should include a conclusion on the value for money 
achieved by local authorities and their findings should be widely communicated to 
citizens. In addition, in order to promote collaboration between internal and external 
auditors, OCEX could use local government’s self-assessments on performance as a 
starting point. Through financial and compliance audits, external auditors should 
comment on those performance indicators that are useful in management. 
There are some aspects that have not been tackled in this paper and need future 
research. These include the insufficiency of human and material resources in OCEX 
to accomplish performance audits, as well as the potential benefits and risks of 
commissioning part of the audit work with private agencies. Also, it would be 
interesting to analyse the reasons behind politicians’ reluctance to promote this kind 
of auditing. In this regard, the survey must be extended to local politicians and to the 
public in general. International experience in this field needs to be considered by 
countries such as Spain in order to improve the effectiveness of their public audit. 
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